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In this article I examine the elective affinity
between Pentecostalism and the vibrant video-film
industry that has flourished in the wake of Ghana’s
adoption of a democratic constitution. I argue
that, as a result of the liberalization and commer-
cialization of the media, a new public sphere has
emerged that can no longer be fully controlled by
the state but that is increasingly indebted to
Pentecostalism. Pentecostalism and video-films
come together and articulate alternative, Christian
imaginations of modernity. Seeking to grasp the
blurring of boundaries between religion and
entertainment, I examine the pentecostalite cul-
tural style on which these alternative visions
thrive. My main concern is to investigate the
specific mode through which Pentecostal expres-
sive forms go public, thereby transforming the
public sphere. [Ghana, Pentecostalism, media,
public sphere, video-films, popular culture, style]
I
n the course of the last ten years, the place and the role of both
popular culture and Christian religion have expanded in Ghanaian
society. Once confined to a secluded, partially hidden, and elusive
domain, Christianity—especially its Pentecostal variant—has be-
come increasingly prominent in the media. This expansion has
accompanied Ghana’s move toward democracy following adoption of the
1992 constitution, which entailed the liberalization of the media and the
opening up of public space to the concerns and views of ordinary people.
The Ghanaian video-film industry, which emerged in the course of the late
1980s and really took off in the early 1990s (undertaking more than 50
productions a year), was both facilitated by and an expression of the move
toward democracy. Eagerly echoing the views and concerns of Pentecostal-
charismatic churches, which became increasingly popular in the course of
the 1980s, the video-film industry has contributed significantly to the
emergence of a pentecostally infused—or better: pentecostalite—public
culture.1 With the term pentecostalite I seek to capture the media’s delib-
erate adoption of those expressive forms that signify Pentecostalism and
the proliferation of those forms through various channels in the sphere of
entertainment. My point here is that pentecostalite expressive forms are
characterized by a distinct cultural style that crosscuts different artistic
forms (such as music, popular theater, call-in radio programs, and video-
films) and that testifies to the convergence of Pentecostalism and popular
culture in the newly constituted public realm. This convergence is the key
theme of this article, in which I investigate the emerging nexus of video-
films, religion, and the public sphere and explore new links between these
hitherto more or less disconnected fields.
Debates about religion, media, and politics in postcolonial societies
have mainly focused on political Islam, especially in the Middle East (cf.
Eickelman and Anderson’s pathbreaking 1999 volume on new Muslim
public spheres and Hirschkind 2001a, 2001b on Egypt; see also Larkin
1997, 2000 on Nigeria), and on the rise of Hindu nationalism in India (e.g.,
Babb and Wadley 1995; Dasgupta 2001; Mankekar 1999; Rajagopal 2001).
Considerably less attention has been paid to the public role of Christianity
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in Africa (but see Gifford 1998; Haynes 1996) or to the link
between Pentecostalism, the media, and popular culture
that is generating a new mass-mediated public culture.2
This new public culture is remarkably different from both
political Islam and Hindu nationalism in that it does not
deliberately tie into or reimagine long-standing religious
traditions, for example, by affirming their relevance for
national identity (at the same time discarding others as
impure or syncretistic), but instead propagates the need to
‘‘make a complete break with the past’’ (Meyer 1998a).
Indeed, Pentecostalism recasts modernity as a Christian
project (cf. Coleman 2002; Corten and Marshall-Fratani
2001; Van Dijk 2002) and thus finds itself in marked
opposition to state politics of identity. The result is a field
of tension in which the sometimes literally loud articula-
tion of Pentecostal views evokes strong negative reaction,
especially on the part of the educated elites.
The video-film industry, which was instigated by
imaginative, film-loving, enterprising individuals, many
of whom initially had little knowledge of filmmaking,
remains very close—in complicated ways—to the ideas
and experiences of the inhabitants of big cities like Accra,
who are thrilled to see their own surroundings on screen.
Taking as points of departure the latest rumors about
individuals’ illicit acquisition of wealth, confessions about
the work of Satan and his demons, and—inevitably—
testimonies about the miracles brought about by the Holy
Spirit and by Pentecostal pastors, video-films are inspired
by and woven into the texture of everyday life. They project
pentecostalite mediations of popular culture onto the
screens of big cinemas, small video centers in the suburbs,
and domestic TV-VCRs.
These projections run counter to a state politics of
identity, which thrived especially under the Rawlings re-
gime (1981–92) and that—in an Nkrumahist tradition—
emphasized the importance of ‘‘cultural heritage’’ for the
enlightenment of the nation and the deployment of ‘‘Afri-
can personality.’’3 As Brian Larkin (2000) documented in
the case of Nigeria, the Ghanaian state lost its control over
the public imagination of community through the unex-
pected emergence of the video-film industry, which oc-
curred behind the backs of both global media industries
and the state. For, next to the images of enlightenment,
national integration, and cultural roots featured by the
state-owned Ghana Film Industry Corporation (GFIC)
stood alternative images projected by independent video-
film producers, who by and large propounded a Christian
version of modernity. The sale of the GFIC to a Malaysian
television company in 1996 marked the end of state-owned
cinema and the beginning of a new era (Meyer 1999a,
2001; cf. Coe 2000) in which the representation of culture
and identity became a matter of fierce public debate. Thus,
with the liberalization and commercialization of the hith-
erto state-controlled media, the state-driven representa-
tion of the nation to its citizens was rivaled by alternative
imaginations, geared more to global Christianity than to
the national project.
The rise of pentecostalite expressive forms and the
increasing electronic mediation of popular culture in vid-
eo-films are aspects of a more general shift characterized
by the increasing incapacity of the state to control media
and society and by the emergence of a new ‘‘representa-
tional economy’’ rife with public conflict and contest
(Keane 2002:65). Meant to ‘‘capture the ways in which
practices and ideologies put words, things, and actions
into complex articulation with one another’’ (Keene
2002:85), the notion of representational economy is useful
to grasp tensions about the relations among and value of
certain cultural expressions in Ghana’s new mediascape.
To understand the marked articulation of pentecostalite
style in video-films and, for that matter, other forms of
popular culture, it is necessary to take into account actual
changes in the relationship between the postcolonial state
and society (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 2000), between
politics and performance (cf. Gunner 2001). Such changes
cannot be fully understood by recurring to earlier analyses
of African postcoloniality, which were geared to a different
historical configuration centered on the totalitarian one-
party state and its power to force society into a shared
living space (e.g., Mbembe 1992). My interest here does
not merely concern the reasons behind the rise of Pente-
costalism per se but focuses above all on the ways in which
it is articulated in public: that is, its smooth and easy link
with entertainment and the forces of commercialization,
as well as its impressive capacity to push its expressive
forms into a wider arena, reaching beyond the sphere of
religious institutions.
How, then, can one map out this wider arena of
pentecostalite impact, which, as a result of democratiza-
tion and liberalization, is taking shape between the forces
of the postcolonial state and those of the global market—
without, however, being fully absorbed or left undis-
turbed by either? Provided that one moves beyond Hab-
ermas’s (1990) all too narrow, normative understanding
of O¨ffentlichkeit (cf. Calhoun 1992; Hansen 1991; Lee
1992; Warner 1992), any exploration of this arena, which
may well be termed the ‘‘public sphere,’’ must link up
with debates about the place and role of religion in
modern societies. Habermas (1990:67, 163), in his few
remarks about religion, appears to take for granted that in
the framework of the modern state religion has been
reduced to the private sphere: Religious convictions only
emerge in public debates as opinions, where they have to
compete with other opinions in line with agreed on,
rational discursive rules.4 The inadequacy of this view,
which is based on the assertion of the public decline of
religion as an intrinsic feature of modernity—most suc-
cinctly articulated by the secularization thesis yet also
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informing much theorizing in the social sciences in a
more implicit, taken-for-granted manner—is patent. It is
impossible to overlook how, on the one hand, religious
groups all over the world successfully manifest them-
selves in the public sphere, often by making use of new
and old mass media, and how, on the other hand, mass
media offer a stage for religion. This public articulation of
religion amounts to more than merely generating opin-
ions to inform rational debate in the sense of Habermas
or, conversely, expressing a conservative ‘‘reaction against
unreachable modernization (be it capitalist or socialist),
the evil consequences of globalization, and the collapse
of the post-nationalist project’’ (Castells 1997:19). What is
at stake is the genesis of new expressive forms, dis-
courses, moods, and modes of debate.
At the same time, to grasp such evident public artic-
ulations of religion, it is not sufficient merely to address
the ‘‘comeback’’ of religion as an ‘‘empirical given’’ (De
Vries 2001:6 – 7) and to point out time and again the
inadequacy of the secularization thesis. It is necessary to
get beyond a modernist framework that takes for granted a
distinction between the spheres of ‘‘politics’’ and ‘‘reli-
gion’’ (cf. Asad 1999; Van der Veer 2001) or between
‘‘public’’ and ‘‘private’’ (Casanova 1994), in which the
latter forms the privileged space of religion, and to address
the blurring of these distinctions and the emergence of
new modes of communication and debate in the public
sphere. In so doing, it is crucial to explore, both empiri-
cally and conceptually, how—that is, through which rep-
resentational modes—religion goes public. In other words,
emphasis needs to be placed not so much on the message
of religion as such but, rather, on religion as a particular
practice of mediation (see also Van der Veer 1999). Medi-
ation creates and maintains links between religious leaders
and followers by involving both parties in a relationship
with the realm of the invisible or spiritual, which, although
constructed and affirmed through mediation, tends to
claim a reality of its own. Religion, I argue, cannot be
analyzed apart from the forms and practices of mediation
that define it. It is a resource generating distinct forms of
expression that are not limited to the institutional sphere
but that are articulated in, and partly (re)shape, the public
sphere in the information age.
To grasp how Pentecostalism in Ghana has expanded
beyond the confines of fixed institutions and gone public,
it is necessary to explore how it is articulated on the
surface of social life. At first sight this exploration may
seem anachronistic, as Pentecostalism, and for that mat-
ter Protestantism, is usually held to privilege content
above form and to employ the signs and symbols on
the surface of social life as vehicles for underlying mean-
ings. In a powerful critique, Talal Asad argues that inter-
pretive, Geertzian approaches to religion, which ‘‘insist on
the primacy of meaning without regard to the processes
by which meanings are constructed’’ (1993:43), do not
offer a universal definition of religion but instead repro-
duce a distinctly modern, Protestant understanding that
narrows religion down to a question of belief. This cri-
tique implies a tremendous challenge for students of
religion in general, especially for students of Protestant-
ism. For example, Pentecostal discourse in Ghana teaches
that all that meets the eye is mere surface, still to be
vested with meaning—a process accomplished through
the study of the Bible or through direct intervention of
the Holy Spirit. The notion of being ‘‘born again’’ is
continuously evoked and described as a complete change
of the inner person, the culmination of true belief. ‘‘Su-
perficiality’’ and ‘‘hypocrisy’’—behaving as if one is born
again yet actually missing this deep inner change—are
condemned as major sins, as they appear to undermine
the image Pentecostalism draws of itself. Especially be-
cause an interpretive approach seems to accommodate
this image so easily, it is difficult for a researcher to create
and maintain a reflexive distance between Pentecostal
discourse and anthropological analysis. And, yet, the
point here is to refrain from uncritically adopting an
interpretive approach on the level of analysis, while at
the same time taking into account as an empirical given
that Pentecostal self-representations privilege content
above form, meaning above symbols, inside above out-
side, and that they view the physical as a mere vehicle for
the spiritual. I propose to meet this challenge by focusing
on Pentecostalism as a particular practice of signification
in which the emphasis on being born again and the need
to produce meaning by relying on God feature promi-
nently. The alleged disregard of surface, to put it some-
what crudely, is part and parcel of the articulation of
Pentecostalism on the surface of social life.
To grasp this articulation and thus go beyond Pente-
costalism’s self-representation, I propose to employ the
notion of style. Although in the field of art history and
criticism this concept has been subject to much debate
(e.g., Lang 1987), I still find the notion appealing because
it enables one to discern overlaps and links between
different expressive forms and, at the same time, to grasp
how a certain stylistic complex differs from other styles.
Style thus serves both as a marker of distinction and as a
means of including or even absorbing various expressive
forms channeled through different registers, such as ser-
mon, film, music, theater, popular painting, or oratory. In
this sense, style crosscuts genres. The possibility of deter-
mining key features that make an expressive form identi-
fiable (as, for instance, pentecostalite) is what style is all
about. Style, as Gombrich (1960) has argued, works to
reduce the complexity of the world. In the same way that
meaningful expression depends on the systematic order-
ing that defines style, style also imposes its own regula-
tions and constraints on its users (and in this sense comes
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close to Foucault’s notion of discourse; see also Layton
1997:209–210).
For the purpose of my argument, it is important to get
beyond an understanding of style as a more or less abstract
organizing principle. Benedict Anderson’s statement that
‘‘communities are to be distinguished not by their falsity/
genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined’’
(1991:6) highlights the importance of style in constructing
and maintaining particular sociocultural formations. With-
in the confines of this article, it is impossible for me to
discuss how, in the social and cultural sciences, style has
been employed to understand the genesis of new commu-
nities of taste, sentiment, and other markers of inclusion. I
would, however, like to briefly introduce two authors, the
Africanist anthropologist James Ferguson and the micro-
biologist and philosopher Ludwik Fleck, who both have
used the notion of style imaginatively outside the confines
of aesthetic theory.5 Their thoughts are of immediate
relevance to my attempt to develop a notion of style as
integral to Pentecostal practices of mediation in the con-
text of Ghana’s new representational economy.
In his study of urban culture in the Zambian Copper-
belt James Ferguson (1999) advocates the concept of
‘‘cultural style.’’ Inspired by the work of Dick Hebdige,
Anthony Cohen, and Judith Butler, Ferguson rejects a
simplistic view of style as a ‘‘secondary manifestation of
a prior or given ‘identity’ or ‘orientation’ which style then
‘expresses’ ’’ and emphasizes that style is a ‘‘performative
competence,’’ a ‘‘form of practical signifying activity’’
(1999:96). Importantly, this notion goes against common-
sense understandings of style as opposed to content—of
manner versus matter, so to speak. Far from simply re-
versing the emphasis on content by attending to style,
Ferguson questions the simplistic opposition of content
and form, essence and surface, in which style is reduced to
a mere vehicle for an underlying essence. Style, in his
understanding, mediates between content and form. Fer-
guson calls anthropologists to leave behind their interpre-
tive bias in favor of a performance approach (see also
Fabian 1990) and, thus, to move ‘‘away from the quest to
locate underlying ‘real’ identities and orientations that ‘lie
behind’ or are ‘expressed in’ styles, and . . . towards the
enacted, performed surface of social life’’ (1999:97). He
asserts that ‘‘in the study of style, the how is all-important,
and the old idea of culture as the ideational content of
expressive behaviour is inadequate. For although style
always involves knowledge, it is a practical kind of knowl-
edge: more ‘knowing how’ than ‘knowing that’ ’’ (Ferguson
1999:98).
From this perspective, it is possible to investigate the
emergence and proliferation of pentecostalite expressive
forms outside the confines of churches without taking for
granted that those participating in common stylistic prac-
tices all share an underlying inner disposition (such as
being born again), morals, and doctrine. Rather, the focus
is on the stylistic devices that articulate Pentecostal views
of what the world is about. Emphasizing the need to grasp
the ‘‘what’’ through the ‘‘how,’’ the notion of style is useful
for studying Pentecostalism as a practice of mediation. The
use of this notion allows one to avoid the pitfall of an
interpretive approach, which, in the study of Protestant-
ism, as I have argued, tends to be self-fulfilling and
tautological. It facilitates a fresh look at the public pres-
ence of Pentecostal-derived forms by enabling observers to
discern how those forms differ from other forms and to
determine the extent to which Pentecostalism is being
signified in various channels of expression, linking up
religion, popular culture, and even (cultural) politics.
To grasp the power of style to bind people, it is useful
to briefly turn to Ludwik Fleck. In 1935, he developed the
notion of ‘‘Denkstil’’ (style of thinking), which he circum-
scribed as the ‘‘preparedness for focused perception and
corresponding processing of the perceived’’ (Fleck 1980:
187). This preparedness to perceive, think, and speak in the
framework of a certain style, Fleck argued, is not a question
of mere individual, rational choice or an immediate reflec-
tion of truth. Rather, it stems from the particular mood
(Stimmung) prevailing in a certain Denkkollektiv, that is, a
sociological structure of knowledge production that incor-
porates yet surpasses individual participants and offers
them a distinct Denkstil. Although Fleck examined the
emergence and operation of ‘‘styles of thinking’’ in the field
of modern science (and thus inspired Thomas Kuhn to
develop the notion of scientific paradigms), he emphasized
that ‘‘styles of thinking’’ also exist outside the confines of
science.6 Importantly, Fleck insisted that what links people
to a Denkstil is not that style’s capacity to make true state-
ments about the world but, rather, the mood it radiates.
Style, by putting things in a certain way, speaks to, as well as
evokes, emotions. Employing an ensemble of recurring key
terms and conventions, style makes people feel at home in,
as well as confident with, a particular discourse. In the
analysis that follows, this proposed link between style and
mood is important, because it highlights that the ‘‘how’’ is
what binds people together and ascertains allegiance. Pen-
tecostalism’s articulation in the public sphere, then, is not a
question of merely exposing views but also a matter of
expanding a certain mood from churches into wider soci-
ety—introducing a new ‘‘atmosphere’’ in the public sphere.
To summarize, in this article I examine the conditions
that make possible the articulation of a pentecostalite style
in video-films, the reasons for such films’ appeal, and the
debates and contestations they evoke. I take as a point of
departure that the emergence, proliferation, and attraction
of these films depend on significant changes in state–
society relations. In the same way that religion no longer
remains confined to the place assigned it by the state, film
can no longer be used to assert the state’s control over
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visual forms of representation. I argue that Pentecostalism
and video-films come together and contribute to carving
out a new public space for the articulation of alternative
imaginations of modernity. To grasp the blurring of
boundaries between Pentecostalism and entertainment,
in this article I offer a close investigation of the cultural
style on which these alternative visions thrive in the
context of a new representational economy. The focus
here is not so much on religious content per se—and
certainly not on an increase of Pentecostal religiosity
(conceived in a narrow sense as belief)—but, rather, on
the public presence of mass-mediated religion, brought
about by practices of signification that affirm a new
cultural style. My main concern is to investigate the
specific mode through which Pentecostal expressive forms
go public, thereby transforming the public sphere. As a
particular, highly visually inclined mode of mediation,
Pentecostalism links up as easily with visual technology
as the latter parasitically appropriates the former. What
emerges is a blurring of Pentecostalism, popular culture,
and politics—a new configuration in which Pentecostalism
is no longer fully contained in a distinct, bounded sphere
but is an ever expansive mode of signification.
Pentecostalism, popular culture, and the state
Before turning to the pentecostalite style propounded by
video-films, it is important to assess the popularity and
position of Pentecostalism in Ghana. Because fission is
part of its logic, which also emphasizes individual encoun-
ters with the Holy Spirit, there are a huge number of
Pentecostal-charismatic churches. Indeed, as David Mar-
tin has remarked, the appeal of Pentecostalism in general
stems from the fact that it ‘‘is not a church or any kind of
system, but a repertoire of recognizable spiritual affinities
which constantly breaks out in new forms. This repertoire
generates endless schisms as well as self-help religiosity,
expressed in many thousands of micro-enterprises’’
(2002:176). By its very nature, Pentecostalism lends itself
to being recast over and over in new forms; at the same
time, however, these forms are similar enough to present
themselves as Pentecostal or as charismatic.
One characteristic feature of Pentecostalism is its
successful incorporation of local ideas and practices per-
taining to old gods, witchcraft, and new spirits such as
Mami Water (the Indian or European-looking female spirit
at the bottom of the ocean who promises wealth in
exchange for love). At the same time that Pentecostalists
confirm the existence of local supernatural entities, they
regard them as demons in league with Satan. In contrast
to the orthodox mission churches, which regarded such
local ideas as irrational ‘‘superstitions’’ to be left behind
by converts, or at least to be overcome by education,
Pentecostal churches took these views as a point of de-
parture. In Pentecostal deliverance sessions, for example,
the exorcism of demons holds a central place. One could
argue that people’s fascination with such sessions stems
not only from the fact that they are rituals through which
demons are eventually exorcised, but also from the fact
that the sessions allow demons to manifest themselves
through their—initially, often unaware—hosts, thereby
juxtaposing mirror images of traditional and neotradi-
tional forms of possession (Meyer 1998a, 1999b). In short,
to a very large extent, Pentecostalism’s popularity stems
from the fact that it takes seriously popular views about
spirits and thus ties into a popular understanding of
modernity as enchanted. The relationship between Pente-
costalism and popular culture should be viewed in dialec-
tic terms: The former feeds into the latter, thereby
transforming it, and vice versa. Pentecostalism’s appropri-
ation of popular culture is not confined to the level of
ideas. Whereas the state does not offer a viable infrastruc-
ture for artistic production, Pentecostal-charismatic
churches run commercial recording and editing studios
and printing facilities, thereby drawing many artists who
previously would have described themselves as ‘‘secular’’
into the realm of Pentecostalism (cf. Collins 2002).7 At the
same time, private, independent newspapers and films,
whose producers depend for their financial success on
appealing to broad audiences, increasingly echo Pente-
costal views, thereby contributing in important ways to
the emergence of a pentecostalite public culture. In this
sense, privatization of media facilitates the expansion of
pentecostalite style.
Whereas Pentecostalism’s capacity to absorb and
recast popular culture appears to be one of its remarkable
and enduring features, its relationship to the Ghanaian
state has changed considerably in the course of the last
two decades. In fact, during that period the state itself
was transformed considerably, from a military dictator-
ship devoted to socialist ideals and the creation of a civil
society in its own image to a more or less democratic
state granting freedom of expression of critical views in
a public sphere by and large uncontrolled by the state,
yet highly influenced by the global market. In the course
of the 1980s churches became alternative avenues for
Ghanaians’ material success, as the state, quite contrary
to the spirit of Rawlings’s ‘‘revolution,’’ failed to live up
to its citizens’ expectations. Initially, the Pentecostal-
charismatic churches were content to operate within
a strictly religious sphere. Far from seeking to contest
Rawlings’s legitimacy, as was the case with the former
mission churches represented by the Christian Council
and the Catholic Church, the Pentecostals concentrated
on the propagation of individual success, health, and
wealth (Gifford 1998)—quite an attractive program in the
eyes of ordinary Ghanaians experiencing severe economic
problems—and were politically quiescent (Akyeampong
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1996). Relatively self-contained, they did not assume any
significant role in relation to the state and politics.
Despite the implementation of IMF Structural Adjust-
ment policies by the end of the 1980s, which resulted in a
steady flow of global commodities into the country after
an extended period of scarcity, most ordinary Ghanaians
still suffered economic hardship (whereas those close to
Rawlings were said to become richer and richer). During
that period, the regime still sought to control civil society
fully and to prevent the expression of criticism in public
(Gyimah-Boadi 1994). Far from drawing an absolute
boundary between religion and politics, the regime em-
phasized the importance of ‘‘traditional religion’’ for gen-
erating ‘‘national pride’’ in what became reified as ‘‘the
African heritage.’’ In so doing, the regime was geared
toward both assigning a place to traditional authorities
and recasting the diverse local religious and cultural
traditions in one encompassing frame, in terms of a
‘‘national heritage.’’
The separation of the spheres of politics and Pente-
costalism lasted until the early 1990s, when Pentecostalists
started to move beyond their sole focus on church affairs
and the private lives of church members and ventured into
debates about the state of the nation. They developed a
distinct dualistic political theology that asserted that
Ghana would only prosper and progress under a God-
fearing leader (Gifford 1998:85) but that the country would
be brought down by a leader relying on occult forces. Not
only did Pentecostalists start to partake in discussions
about the (im)morality of power, but, even more impor-
tantly, their marked presence in the political arena also
significantly influenced the terms constituting the debate
about the state of the nation as such (Meyer 1998b:28 ff.).
Here Pentecostalism certainly did not enter the newly
evolving space of public debate as ‘‘opinion,’’ but it rear-
ticulated the terms of political debate in a new manner:
casting Ghana as in dire need of purification through the
Christian God. The fact that Pentecostalists were able to
successfully mobilize Christian discourse as a resource for
political debate indicates the extent to which the public
perceived the political repertoire of the state as exhausted
and morally corrupt. In the course of the 1990s, Pentecos-
talism became a force in the political arena that those in
power could no longer neglect. Already in the wake of the
1992 elections, Rawlings himself showed a much more
accommodating stance toward Pentecostal-charismatic
churches than he had before. The reason for this, in my
view, lay in the fact that he realized the tremendous social
importance of these churches and their ability to mobilize
people on a mass base. Pentecostal-charismatic churches’
negative attitude toward ‘‘tradition’’ and ‘‘African religion’’
notwithstanding, Rawlings certainly preferred cooperation
with their populist leaders to having to rely on the elite
clergy of the mainline churches (Gifford 1998:70–71).8
The government’s positive attitude toward Pentecos-
talism continued in the wake of the 1996 elections, when
both government and opposition tended to represent
Ghanaian politics as a battlefield between the powers of
God and Satan. Not only did the electoral commission
distribute a poster juxtaposing an image of the devil as a
symbol of corruption with that of an angel as a symbol of
good citizenship (Meyer 1998b:16), but those involved in
political campaigns and debates also made the responsi-
bility for the future of the nation dependent on individual
believers, on their prayers and votes, and on the moral
standards of politicians. During the elections in December
2000, which resulted in the defeat of Rawlings’s NDC, the
Pentecostalists continued the political strategies they had
begun at the beginning of the 1990s. Pentecostal-charis-
matic churches organized prayers for the nation and
sought to keep the electoral process peaceful. Detailed
research on the relationship between Pentecostalism and
nationalism would be productive; even without such re-
search, it is clear that Pentecostalists viewed good citizen-
ship and Christian virtues as two sides of the same coin. In
other words, in their view, nationalism without Christian-
ity would do the country no good (cf. Van Middendorp
2001). The Pentecostal view thus offered a perspective on
nationalism that clashed with the state view of the nation
as rooted in ‘‘tradition’’ and ‘‘heritage.’’
Moreover, Pentecostalists were very quick to under-
stand the implications of the liberalization of the media,
which entailed a shift from state ownership of and control
over radio, TV, and the serious press to privatization and
commercialization of these outlets (cf. Hackett 1998). Their
eagerness to use mass media stemmed not only from the
obvious fact that broadcasting their message through radio
and TV to mass audiences was the perfect way to prosely-
tize, but also, as I show in more detail below, from the
elective affinity between the Pentecostal emphasis on
‘‘vision’’ and the new audiovisual technologies. Numerous
Pentecostal-charismatic churches have become relatively
well-to-do organizations, both because they belong to a
global network and maintain links with similar churches in
the United States and South America and because they
successfully urge their members to contribute money to
them. Therefore they can easily buy airtime and broadcast
their activities through radio and TV. Nowadays, early in
the mornings, virtually all Ghanaian radio stations offer
zealous sermons by Pentecostal preachers who advertise
their powers of deliverance and seek to attract more people
to their church, and especially in the evenings, in addition
to a wide variety of Christian programs, television viewers
encounter a string of trailers advertising particular
churches and their crusades. Their easy adoption of mass
media reveals that Pentecostalists have as few concerns
about marketing their religion as they do about endorsing
the prosperity gospel (Coleman 2002; Maxwell 1998), and
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they have broadened their practices of mediation to mass
audiences whom they address as potential followers. In
this sense, the marked articulation of Pentecostalism in the
newly commercialized and liberalized mass media is an
integral feature of a distinct historical moment, character-
ized by a transformed relationship between Pentecostalism
and the state and the loud voice assigned to Pentecostalists
in Ghana’s new representational economy. At the same
time, in their competition for audiences, private media
easily and eagerly link up with Pentecostal views.9 This is
especially clear in the case of the video-film industry.
Video-films as new mass entertainment
My first encounter with Ghanaian films took place in
December 1991 in Accra, when I was still involved in my
research on local appropriations of Christianity. I encoun-
tered a billboard, placed at Sankara Circle, that depicted a
snakeman and advertised the film Diabolo (1992), to be
shown at the Rex Cinema, an open-air cinema in the
center of town, close to the coastal road and Makola
market. The film was about a man who transformed
himself into a snake and entered the vaginas of prostitutes,
making the women vomit money (cf. Meyer 1995; see also
Wendl 2001). Seated in the midst of an excited audience
that continuously commented on and at times directly
addressed the characters on the screen and that at times
shrieked with horror, I realized that Diabolo was a hit.
Viewers were thrilled to see this sort of local, popular
imagery on screen. The film became the talk of the town.
What fascinated me most was that the film depicted a story
of snakes, money, and the perversion of reproduction,
themes I had encountered in various versions many times
in the context of prayer sessions in Pentecostal churches
and during interviews with church members. Although the
similarity of the issues addressed in films like Diabolo and
in church sermons is truly striking, an important differ-
ence between these two forms of expression lies in the fact
that Ghanaian films are a form of mass entertainment
enjoyed by a vast audience that includes many who are
not members of a Pentecostal church.
The popularity of video-films is a mass phenomenon
encompassing the urban lower and (aspiring) middle
classes and—because the main language spoken in most
films is English—cutting across ethnic divisions while at
the same time assuming a certain level of education.
Women are especially fond of watching films, and they
often take the initiative in convincing their boyfriends and
husbands to go to the movies or to buy a particular home
video. Because films usually portray the character of the
pious mother and wife, many women encounter signifi-
cant role models, and even more importantly, regard
video-films as educational devices that will teach good
moral lessons to their partners. Ghanaian films address
new audiences eager to spend part of their leisure time in
cinemas and video-theaters and to absorb the mixture of
Christian entertainment, morals, horror, and magic that
characterize them. In this context, it is important to keep
in mind that the late 1980s marked the end of a decade of
political instability during which curfews were a recurring
feature. A relationship certainly exists between the thriving
of new leisure activities, such as going to the movies to
watch the latest film, and the gradual return to democracy
leading to the constitution of new publics. The contrast
with the preceding ‘‘culture of silence’’ (Nugent 1996)
could not be more marked.
Although popular in certain circles, from the outset
video-films evoked strong protests from film critics, estab-
lished filmmakers, and intellectuals, because these films
allegedly affirmed outdated superstitions and drew an all-
too-negative image of Ghanaian religious and cultural
traditions (Meyer 1999a). Although at first sight, it may
appear that the correct representation of ‘‘culture’’ and
‘‘traditional religion’’ forms the main bone of contention
between the video-filmmakers and their critics, a closer
look at the conflict reveals that the representations of the
two factions do not offer mirror images of a ‘‘traditional
culture’’ and ‘‘religion’’ still alive within Ghanaian society.
Whereas the state-trained filmmakers closely followed the
Nkrumahist perspective of the state, the video-filmmakers
gave vision to popular ideas of ‘‘traditional religion.’’ The
conflict came to the fore clearly during a May 2000 confer-
ence on religion and the media in a debate between
filmmaker William Akuffo and representatives of the neo-
traditional movement Afrikania, which had been closely
affiliated with the Rawlings regime.10 When Afrikania rep-
resentatives accused Akuffo and his fellow filmmakers of
misrepresenting ‘‘traditional religion,’’ Akuffo retorted that
it was not filmmakers’ intention to provide correct images
of priests and rituals but, rather, simply to visualize ordi-
nary people’s views on ‘‘traditional religion.’’11 These
views, as Akuffo admitted, were heavily influenced by
Pentecostal representations (which, of course, are reifica-
tions of ‘‘traditional religion’’ in terms of diabolization).
Yet, Akuffo asked, were not filmmakers free to create
images as they pleased? Did they always have to make sure
that what they brought to the screen matched reality? If that
was the case, Akuffo asked provocatively, why should U.S.
filmmakers be allowed to make movies in which the United
States wins the Vietnam War, whereas everybody knows
that this is not true?12 To Akuffo, film was meant to invent
imaginary spaces and should not be subject to a regime of
truthful representation. On one level, this perspective on
film, which deliberately loosens the referential relationship
between image and reality, appears to clash with the state
perspective, which claims to represent reality and thus
vests the image with truth.13 On another level, however,
Akuffo’s stance exposes the latter perspective—all claims of
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truthful representation and documentation notwithstand-
ing—as also engaging in ‘‘imagining and re-imagining
tradition’’ (Ranger 1993). For the state’s claims are part
and parcel of a particular mode of representation rather
than a reflection of an existing reality ‘‘out there’’ and thus
produce a favorable depiction of ‘‘traditional religion’’ in
line with the state’s cultural policies. On closer examina-
tion, then, it appears that both factions produce their own
reifications of ‘‘traditional religion’’ and ‘‘culture,’’ vest
them with value, and launch them into Ghana’s new
representational economy.
Video-film producers, who usually also write the
scripts, select the actors, and direct the films, are highly
conscious of and seek to meet audience expectations
because they cannot afford to have a film flop. The costs
for one production vary from $5,000 to $15,000, and the
money invested has to be gained back through the sale of
cinema tickets, the sale of exhibition rights to TV compa-
nies, and, increasingly, the sale of home videos. Producers
usually inhabit the same lifeworlds as their audiences, and
they keep their ears and eyes open to what happens
around them, always eager to come up with new stories.
In this sense, video-filmmakers act as mediators of popular
culture.14 Their products have more in common with the
soap operas, Indian films (Larkin 1997), and Nigerian
video-movies (Haynes 2000) that started to enter the
Ghanaian market in the late 1990s than with those expres-
sions of ‘‘African cinema’’ that reach Western movie
screens; they are certainly not auteur films conveying a
distinct director’s view but feature everyday life and affirm
prevailing moods and structures of feeling. Films have to
be easily accessible and consumable, however, without
being boring. Reflecting as they do the banal and the
ordinary, they require a little extraordinary twist—often
realized through special effects. At the same time, to be
popular, a film is expected to raise a relevant social issue,
which viewers will then subsequently discuss in all sorts of
contexts, from taxi to market or even on the radio—as well
as with an inquiring anthropologist. This sort of debate
always leads to considerations beyond a particular film,
right into the realm of everyday experience. The strong
popularity of Nigerian video-films since the late 1990s has
put additional financial pressure on Ghanaian producers.
The fact that audiences started to prefer Nigerian films for
their more explicit depiction of evil and violence made
Ghanaian producers seek effective ways and means to
compete. This resulted in more emphasis on transgressive
behavior, occult forces, and special effects.
Although producers are aware that films are popular-
ized by women—and hence make sure that films feature
the female role models women cherish—they consciously
seek to address a broad audience constituted by different
‘‘classes,’’ from the semiliterate fish mongers and fisher-
men in the suburbs, who often do not speak English
fluently, to the drivers, traders, market-women, and
seamstresses of the middle classes, and to the teachers,
secretaries, nurses, and doctors who are viewed as people
of ‘‘high class.’’ To cater to the expectations of all ‘‘clas-
ses,’’ films often combine slapstick humor (usually involv-
ing a houseboy from the north who mocks his master),
horror, action, and romance. There is virtually no differ-
entiation into distinct genres—the only difference is that
between films primarily focusing on ‘‘occult forces’’ and
those that focus on ‘‘family drama’’—and the main narra-
tive structure is melodramatic, albeit not entirely in the
sense of Western melodrama theory (see the overview by
Gledhill 1987). The point here is not to press Ghanaian
films into Western categories. Yet, at the same time, one
has to acknowledge that these films do not evolve from
scratch but have absorbed and blurred different cinematic
genres and cultural forms. Thus, they should not be seen
as authentic representations of locality simply emerging
from below but, rather, as located at the crossroads of, and
acting as mediators between, local and global aesthetic
forms. In the following section I explore how existing work
on melodrama can help to illuminate how Ghanaian films,
as an aesthetic form, link up with modernity. This inves-
tigation, I hope, will also contribute to a broader, truly
global understanding of melodrama as a genre.
Melodrama and modernity
In The Melodramatic Imagination (1976), Peter Brooks has
argued that melodrama emerged at a moment character-
ized by the checkmate between church and monarchy in
the aftermath of the French Revolution. As a literary genre
that creates drama out of the stuff of everyday life, melo-
drama conveys a distinctly modern aesthetics that is
engaged in ‘‘the effort to make the ‘real’ and the ‘ordinary’
and the ‘private life’ interesting through heightened dra-
matic utterance and gesture that lay bare the true stakes’’
(Brooks 1976:14). Asserting that the ordinary and banal
deserve attention, melodrama sets out to reveal the un-
derlying forces that govern what happens on the surface of
everyday life. Thus, melodramatic writers posit the neces-
sity ‘‘to go beyond the surface of the real to the truer,
hidden reality, to open up the world of spirit’’ (Brooks
1976:2). In melodrama, the forces operating beneath the
surface are what Brooks calls the ‘‘moral occult, the
domain of operative spiritual values which is both indi-
cated within and masked by the surface of reality. The
moral occult is not a metaphysical system; it rather is a
repository of the fragmentary and desacralized remnants
of sacred myth’’ (1976:5, see also 20). Importantly, the
realm beneath the surface is rendered in moral, rather
than individual, psychological terms: Inner conflicts are
depicted as a Manichean struggle between good and evil
(Brooks 1976:19 ff.)—a struggle bemoaning the loss of the
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sacred that once formed the backbone of society and that
stood central in the arts. Melodrama, in Brooks’s view,
makes up for the loss of religion that characterizes modern
society (a point to which I return below).15
To avoid misunderstandings, it is important to em-
phasize that Brooks does not argue that melodrama simply
reveals an already existing underlying realm of meanings
waiting to be uncovered. The point is that, as a distinctly
modern aesthetic form, melodrama is involved in creating
such a realm as part of a new, modern mind-set. Based on
the notion that insight depends on penetrating the surface,
melodrama thus underpinned, popularized, and still main-
tains—by its spread into other artistic forms, for instance,
soap operas—the interpretive stance that Talal Asad
(1993:65 ff.) identified as typical of a modern perspective
on the self and the world. Here, too, the emphasis on
uncovering meaning is a key feature of melodramatic style.
Although analyzing a different era, place, and art form
(i.e., the novel), Brooks’s notion of melodrama highlights
some important features of Ghanaian films. Melodrama, I
suggest, became easily globalized because it is a distinctly
modern aesthetic form able to articulate and address new
experiences that are difficult to contain by existing, local
expressive forms. Its popularity stems from its basis in the
banality of everyday life and from its promise to lead
readers (in the case of popular novels) and spectators (in
the case of, for instance, soap operas) beyond the surface
of the immediately visible; it seduces by promising knowl-
edge through revelation. Ghanaian films are melodramatic
in that they feature a world rife with conflicts between the
‘‘modern’’ and the ‘‘traditional,’’ are structured by
conflicting kinship relations, and are based on a bipolar
(and in this case explicitly Christian) Manichaeanism
making it easy to distinguish the good from the bad and
privileging morals above intricate psychological ambigui-
ties. In these films the social world boils down to the
microcosm of the family.
Yet, quite contrary to Brooks’s association of the
emergence of melodrama with the attempt to recover the
loss of security caused by the breakdown of traditional
certainties (to a large extent provided by religion) and
social hierarchies, Ghanaian films do not strive for a
nostalgic recuperation of things lost; rather, they demon-
ize the past and strive for a modern future. And rather than
a ‘‘form for secularized times’’ offering ‘‘the nearest ap-
proach to sacred and cosmic values in a world where they
no longer have any certain ontology or epistemology’’
(Brooks 1976:205), melodrama in Ghana asserts and feeds
on Pentecostal religion. This, as I will argue in the remain-
der of this article, is due to the strong resemblance
between melodrama as an aesthetic form and Pentecos-
talism. Film and Pentecostalism can easily converge be-
cause they are similar practices of signification with a
shared cultural style.
Inspired by Brooks, Ravi Vasudevan argued with re-
gard to Indian commercial films that ‘‘the melodramatic
mode has, with various indigenous modifications, been a
characteristic form of narrative and dramaturgy in socie-
ties undergoing the transition to modernity’’ (n.d.:3). Vasu-
devan’s argument also is highly suggestive with regard to
Ghanaian popular cinema and its link with Pentecostalism.
Although I prefer to leave aside the term transition to
modernity, which evokes the somewhat evolutionary tele-
ology of modernization theory, and I view melodrama as
mediating modernity, Vasudevan’s argument that melo-
drama invokes a specific spectatorial subjectivity by offer-
ing a particular cinematic mode of address and thus
‘‘outlines new forms of subjectivity on the grid of the
culturally recognizable’’ (n.d.:7) is well taken. It informs
the following analysis of the ways in which Ghanaian films
promote but also criticize, appropriate, and recast moder-
nity and lay bare its inherent ambivalences. The uncanny
that thrives on these ambivalences is represented in Gha-
naian films in the spectacular mode reminiscent of the
notion of a ‘‘cinema of attractions’’ developed by Gunning
(1986) and elaborated by Vasudevan (n.d.:8).
Pentecostalite style and the interface between
religion and video
A significant starting point in exploring the entanglement
of Pentecostalism and video-films is that they literally
share the material space of the cinema. This cohabitation,
as I have argued elsewhere (Meyer 2002), pinpoints an
appropriation by religion of a key emblem of colonial
modernity. Used in colonial times to convey the message
of ‘‘civilization’’ and ‘‘modernization’’ (see also Morton-
Williams 1953), the cinema served as a temple to a pro-
gressive vision, testifying to the superiority of Western
knowledge and the legitimacy of colonial rule and at the
same time creating a new space for entertainment.
Transforming the space of the cinema into a church,
Pentecostalists appropriated the symbolism of the cinema
hall and of film. In that space they started to propagate
their distinct vision of Christian modernity—a project
evoking yet going beyond older colonial and state-driven
versions of modernity. The video-film industry, as intimat-
ed above, also appropriated the cinema: From the outset,
video producers presented their films as viable substitutes
for celluloid technology; their films occupied the cinema
screens, offering a form of enlightenment quite different
from the rationalistic use of vision that characterized the
colonial and state-controlled cinema, and one indebted
to Christianity.
Recently, video producers have started to market
their films mainly as home videos and for broadcast on
TV, and many Pentecostal congregations have been striv-
ing to move out of the (potentially immoral) space of the
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cinema and to build their own churches.16 Both groups,
however, still share what could be called a cinemato-
graphic perspective, that is, a distinctly modern mode of
penetrating the seemingly chaotic, indeterminate surface
of images to reveal an underlying order. Reminiscent of
U.S. popular Protestantism, for Pentecostalism, ‘‘the act
of looking itself contributes to religious formation and,
indeed, constitutes a powerful practice of belief’’ (Morgan
1998:3). Vision, as I explain in more detail below, plays a
key role in Pentecostal practice and forms the base of
power. Experienced in a dream or as the ‘‘spirit of
discernment,’’ vision is seen by adherents as an extension
of the Holy Spirit who grants the eye of God to his faithful
servants. Sermons and prayer sessions are replete with
statements by both pastors and church members that
they have seen certain spiritual things that in the course
of everyday life normally remain invisible. In this sense,
even prior to the easy accessibility of new visual technol-
ogies, vision was central to Pentecostal practices of me-
diation, and this, in my view, facilitated Pentecostalism’s
appropriation of, as well as by, video and TV.17
If sermons are confined to oral discourse emphasizing
the necessity of vision, films are able to mimetically repro-
duce vision itself. It is certainly no coincidence that Gha-
naian films are cast in a melodramatic form; for as I have
just emphasized, one of the key characteristics of melodra-
ma is its assertion of the need to go beyond the surface of
the visible to reveal the hidden reality underneath. In
Ghanaian films, Pentecostal concerns merge almost natu-
rally with melodrama as an aesthetic form. The conver-
gence between video-films and sermons, I argue, is due to
the fact that both thrive on shared practices of signification,
a shared pentecostalite cultural style. It is apparent from
Akuffo’s statement—that video-films simply depict how
people imagine ‘‘traditional religion’’—that the filmmaker
was highly conscious of what audiences expect to see. At the
same time that he made the statement, Akuffo also empha-
sized how tired he was of constantly representing ‘‘all this
Pentecostal crap,’’ and, yet, he had to do so to make films
that would not flop. In the same vain, Socrate Safo, another
eminent video-film producer, shared with me how much he
wished to produce a film that would be successful at the
Festival Panafricain du Cine´ma et de la Te´le´vision de
Ouagadougou (FESPACO), the prestigious biennial festival
of African film in Burkina Faso; and yet, because Ghanaian
audiences would simply not appreciate the type of film he
wanted to make, he would have to continue giving them
what they liked: films with titles such as Satan’s Wife (2000)
that are replete with demons. Likewise, Hammond Mensah,
one of the most successful producers and a Muslim (be-
longing to the Ahmadiya order), asserted that to survive in
the video-film business one had to make Christian films.
Irrespective of whether they defined themselves as believers
or not, video-film producers felt pressed by audiences to
employ a Christian way of visualizing a narrative, that is, to
deliberately recur to a particular style.18 Even though pro-
ducers were always inclined to experiment and were eager
to come up with something new, they felt the power of the
dominant style. Time and again, the blockbusters that
became the talk of the town (often, films imported from
Nigeria that featured a strong emphasis on the defeat of evil
spirits by God) seemed to prove that a reasonably sure way
to make a profitable film was to consciously appropriate
Pentecostalism’s stylistic repertoire. Many producers
sought to achieve this by sitting with audiences, frequenting
public places, and, above all, listening to their own wives.
The first time I realized the pressure audience expect-
ations may put on producers and directors was in the fall
of 1996, when I watched a video entitled Beast Within
(1993) with a group of youngsters. This film chronicles the
mishaps befalling the managing director of a big company
and his family, who struggle to get things right again—the
wife, in particular, continuously prays to Jesus—but to no
avail. The youngsters with whom I watched the film were
scandalized by the last scene, in which the fetish priest
from the village found the spiritual source of all the
troubles that had befallen the film’s main protagonist,
revealing that a juju, or charm, had called a troublesome
spirit into the house. Furthermore, the juju was hidden
behind the image of Jesus before which the family had so
often prayed in despair (cf. Meyer 1999a). In the young-
sters’ view, it should have fallen to a man of God to put
things right again rather than to a native priest who,
viewers asserted, was himself in league with the powers
of darkness. Because of its ending, I was told by the
youngsters, the film, produced with much care and a
substantial outlay of money, had flopped. This experience,
more than any other, made me realize that the popularity
of films depends on the directors’ skillful use of various
stylistic features. Through further screenings and inter-
views with audience members, I realized that the sure way
for a director to avoid a flop was to avoid making any
negative statements about Christianity.19 The safest for-
mula for success, however, lay in fulfilling at least three
basic, interrelated requirements, which turn out to be key
elements of pentecostalite style and that resonate with
melodrama as a modern aesthetic form: (1) depicting
modernity as the context of everyday life, replete with
seduction and temptation and, so, in need of redemption;
(2) creating a narrative structure that opposes God and the
devil; and (3) offering a kind of vision that combines, if not
almost fuses, Christianity and film, religion and technolo-
gy. Audiences would feel attracted to and be prepared to
say that they ‘‘got something out of’’ a film that success-
fully incorporated these features. Such a successful adop-
tion of style resonates with structures of feeling. This
resonance is reflected in audiences’ reactions: If a film
appeals and people are brought into the right mood, they
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become morally involved with what they see on screen:
shouting at the bad guys, praying for the weak, clapping
for the heroes. Watching in this way is not merely a matter
of seeing through the eyes but is a total bodily experience
(cf. Verrips 2002) that evokes and matches a certain mood
also communicated in Pentecostal-charismatic events.
Christian modernity
As enumerated above, to be successful video-films must
first feature and extol recognized markers of modernity:
beautiful, well-furnished houses; fancy clothes; nice res-
taurants, hotels, and bars; fashionable boutiques; posh
cars driving through the modern infrastructure of the city.
But they must also feature modern notions of personhood,
successfully played out in the nuclear family, the cradle of
modern life that is set up in opposition to the extended
family, which is associated with tradition, backwardness,
and evil (cf. Meyer 2002). Modernity, it should be noted, is
not represented in these films as an option to reject or
adopt, but as a context of urban life. It is depicted—indeed,
presented as a picture to be viewed—as a surface structure
that can only be understood by laying bare its hidden
dimensions. Just as film certainly in the colonial period
was the central medium of modernity, both video-films
and Pentecostalism also mediate their own version of
(Christian) modernity through a shared pentecostalite
style in which vision holds a central place. Of course, this
convergence between film as a medium of modern vision
and the city as the key social and cultural form of moder-
nity has been a central theme for theorists of modernity
from Simmel and Benjamin onward (cf. Donald 1995).
Ghanaian films, in particular, take as a point of departure
a moral geography that draws sharp contrasts between
bright and dark sites: between the metropolitan zones with
their highways and skyscrapers and the bush and the
outskirts of the town where the spirits dwell.
Both video-films and sermons represent many aspects
of modern life as ultimately desirable and as harbingers of
happiness. Both also address the temptations of modernity
and the destructive impact such temptations may have on
people’s lives. Video-films propound a ‘‘morally-controlled
materialism’’ (Marshall-Fratani 1998:282) yet also point out
that modernity abounds with temptations and seductions,
which mainly operate through the desire for sex and that
generate immoral, selfish ways of achieving wealth. The
wife and the pastor are featured as heroes, but husbands
usually appear as weak: Once men achieve a bit of success
in their business (often with the financial help of their
faithful wives), they give in to hedonistic pleasures and,
albeit unconsciously, submit themselves to occult forces.
The higher men climb in terms of power and wealth, the
less able they are to exert self-control and discipline, and
they finally end up empty-handed. The problem, as the
films emphasize, is how to handle modernity’s promises
and temptations, and the answer is clear: Men must adopt
Christian disciplines or techniques of self-control. Pro-
claiming a distinct, Christian version of modernity, video-
films may be viewed as a laboratory for the investigation of
pentecostalist regimes of subjectivity and modes of con-
duct (in the sense of Max Weber’s Lebensfu¨hrung).20
One notices an interesting shift in video-films’ repre-
sentation of subjecthood over time. In many of the earlier
films, evil tends to befall or to press itself on a person,
making him or her behave in an unacceptable way. Evil or
bad behavior, in this perspective, is not so much a ques-
tion of individual choice and responsibility as it is a result
of the presence of spiritual forces taking hold of a person,
occupying his or her inner space, as it were. The question
then becomes how to get rid of these forces and allow the
inner space to be filled by divine power—a task to be
accomplished by Pentecostal prayer and the intervention
of the Holy Spirit. Recently, I have noticed, films place
more emphasis on the possibility of choice. The film
Mariska (2001), for instance, depicts several scenes in
which a person is positioned between two doubles or alter
egos, both of which tell her or him what to do (cf. Meyer
2002). This visual depiction of a tension between two inner
voices, of course, evokes the notion of conscience and
affirms personal responsibility for actions taken. At the
same time, such a depiction evokes the notion of a split
person, whose double is subject to occult forces and thus is
not autonomous but defined in the context of a power
relation. In Mariska, one of the main characters is Mawusi,
who leaves his wife for her mischievous girlfriend. Mawusi
only realizes his fault when he discovers that the girlfriend
keeps his double, in miniature form, under a calabash in
her bedroom. Forced to realize that he is dominated by a
witch, he develops a new constitution characterized by two
inner voices and himself as silent listener.
The models of the person visualized in popular video-
films are remarkably congruent with those promulgated
in the preachings and prayer sessions of Pentecostal-
charismatic churches: Although deliverance prayers are,
above all, meant to exorcise evil spirits and fill a person
with the Holy Spirit (evoking the notion of the empty
inner space or void), sermons increasingly emphasize
personal responsibility and moral subjecthood. This em-
phasis, of course, harkens back to the point, reiterated in
vain by 19th- and early-20th-century orthodox Protestant-
ism, that sin is a matter of personal responsibility rather
than a force coming from outside—sin is the voice of the
devil, as many early African Protestant converts put it
(Meyer 1999b). The fact that Pentecostalism currently
echoes long-standing Protestant concepts of the person
is ironic, because the implausibility and unacceptability of
these concepts for converts at least partly explains the
popularity of Pentecostalism, which initially offered a
notion of the person that came closer to local views. Yet
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Pentecostalism’s gradual shift toward classical missionary
notions of the subject testifies to the extent to which this
religion has become a mediator of modern forms of being.
Pentecostalism has achieved this role through the visual
and verbal deployment of a discourse on the modern self
in the context of a representational economy in which
‘‘Protestantism and modernity (and, one might add, cap-
italism) alike, even conjointly, seek to abstract the subject
from its material and social entanglements in the name of
freedom and authenticity’’ (Keane 2002:81). This attempt
at abstraction is what is shared by both melodrama,
characterized as cinematic form mediating modernity,
and Pentecostalism. It will therefore not come as a
surprise that churches often screen films, letting young
people, especially, feel through images what pastors talk
about in their sermons.
God and the devil
Second, successful films need to take as their basic narra-
tive structure a strict dualism between God and the devil.
Thus, films usually evolve around a struggle between ‘‘the
powers of darkness,’’ on the one hand, with their firm grip
on irresponsible husbands, loose girls, selfish business-
men, greedy mothers-in-law, bad friends, or ritual murder-
ers, killers, and members of secret cults and, on the other
hand, divine power, which always supports the pious
housewife, the innocent child, and, of course, the Pente-
costal pastor (for examples of particular films, cf. Meyer
1999a, 2003a, 2003b). In the end, in such films good must
overcome evil just as in Pentecostal sermons God is
asserted to be stronger than the devil. Reminiscent of
Brooks’s analysis of melodrama, films posit that ‘‘the
world is subsumed by an underlying manichaeism, and
the narrative creates the excitement of its drama by put-
ting us in touch with the conflict of good and evil played
out under the surface of things’’ (1976:4). Hence, as
sermons and deliverance prayers do in words, films hunt
down with the camera all those evil forces hampering a
person’s well-being. Those forces, which may be shown as
deriving from local religious traditions or as crystallized in
selfish, utterly antisocial desires, are not simply written off
as matters of the past but are, rather, recast as forms of
enchantment that are integral to modernity. In other
words, those forces constitute the uncanny that thrives
in modernity’s shades. The films claim to reveal and
indeed capture or overcome such enchantment through
the power of divine vision.
Often films are framed as confessions or testimony,
thereby echoing a distinct genre of Pentecostalist speak-
ing. Such films either start or end with an epigram like
‘‘Thank you, Jesus!’’ ‘‘This film is dedicated to God Al-
mighty,’’ ‘‘Praise the Lord!’’ or a biblical reference. The
film Time (2000), the first Ghanaian –Nigerian coproduc-
tion, for example, takes up the well-known story wherein
an individual exchanges the life of a beloved person for
money (a theme already featured in Diabolo). A desperate
man, who has lost all of his money through his brother-in-
law’s treachery, is lured into an exchange with a cruel and
demanding bush spirit and its eccentric priest and is
asked to sacrifice his wife (i.e., summon and kill her spirit,
causing her physical death) in exchange for new wealth—
an offer he cannot refuse. After his wife dies, the man
keeps her dead body in a closet in his bedroom, where she
vomits banknotes. As the story unfolds, one evil and
violent act follows another, until almost all of the man’s
family is dead. In the last scene, the man’s friend, who has
also come under the power of the bush spirit, takes the
man’s daughter Sarafina, who is a virgin and a born-again
Christian, to the bush spirit’s shrine to sacrifice her. Tied
to a pole, Sarafina calls the name of Jesus in despair, and
fire erupts and destroys the whole shrine—the Holy Spirit
causes hellfire to destroy the sanctuary. The film ends
with a biblical quote (Tim. 1:6–9; the film erroneously
attributes it to Tim. 2) condemning the selfish accumula-
tion of riches.
By introducing a film as a ‘‘true story’’ based on an
individual’s experiences with greed, selfishness, and occult
powers prior to his or her conversion, or by framing a film as
an illustration of the truth of a biblical text, video-film-
makers vest their products with divine authority. The occult
matters they depict, the films assert—much in line with
Pentecostal practice—can only be visualized because they
have already been overcome by divine power. Reminiscent
of one evangelist’s assertion that ‘‘when the knowledge of
Jesus increases, then the knowledge of demons also
increases’’ (Meyer 1999b:162), Ghanaian films point out
that the revelation of occult matters depends on access to
the all-seeing eye of God. An important similarity with
Pentecostal discourse here is that much time is devoted to
a voyeuristic encounter with the ‘‘powers of darkness,’’ and
the films make ample use of special effects in this regard.
Diverging markedly both from the agenda of colonial cin-
ema to do away with so-called superstitions and to educate
the masses and from the agenda of postindependence
state-driven cinema to cherish ‘‘tradition’’ as a ‘‘cultural
heritage’’ and to ‘‘enlighten the nation,’’ popular films
support—and to some spectators even prove—the exis-
tence and evil nature of all those invisible forces that are
central in Pentecostal discourse as well as in popular
experiences. Thus, films are populated by witches, marine
spirits such as Mami Water, and elemental spirits and
their bush shrines, and they feature different types of
magic, all of which testify to the diabolical nature of local
religious traditions. This fascination with the depiction of
occult forces leads right into the perceived ambivalence of
modernity: According to popular understanding, moderni-
ty evokes the sorts of demons that are believed to prevent
the better life that Christian discourse promotes. Indeed,
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the impossibility of a smooth transition to modernity, to
which discourses of conversion and development pertain,
is crystallized in demons, which embody the massive con-
tradictions to which the project of modernity gives rise in
the practice of everyday life (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff
1993; Geschiere 1997; Meyer 1999b; Thoden van Velzen
1995). They embody the uncanny, which ‘‘has represented
the internal limit of modernity, the split within it’’ (Donald
1995:82) and that continues to fascinate audiences who
find in demons the reasons their dreams of good life do not
(fully) materialize. Far from confining spirits to the realm of
mere rumors—the main cultural form through which nar-
ratives about the occult circulated before the emergence of
popular cinema—video-films give spirits public exposure,
thereby turning popular culture into mass-mediated public
culture. In this sense video-films match Gledhill’s observa-
tion that melodrama’s ‘‘enactment of the continuing strug-
gle of good and evil forces running through social, political
and psychic life draws into a public arena desires, fears,
values and identities which lie beneath the surface of the
publicly acknowledged world’’ (1987:33).
Vision: Miracle and special effects
Third and last, to be successful, films must offer a form of
vision similar to the one that Pentecostal pastors usually
present as their source of power and, indeed, authority.
Thanks to the already mentioned ‘‘spirit of discernment,’’
pastors are able to penetrate the invisible powers of
darkness, which mess up people’s lives without ever man-
ifesting themselves visibly. Thus, both popular films and
Pentecostalism trade in a particular mode of vision, claim-
ing the power to reveal that which remains invisible to the
eye yet determines the course of life. Moviegoers are
positioned in such a way that they share the eye of God,
technologically simulated by the camera. Indeed, audien-
ces are made mimetically to share the super vision that
enables God to penetrate the dark; they are addressed as
viewer-believers and even as voyeurs peeping into the
otherwise forbidden. Far from exposing the nonexistence
of invisible forces, in popular film the eye of the camera
zooms in on the operations of such forces and projects
them onto the screen, thereby creating the illusion of
offering firsthand views deep into hell. In this way, the
work of representation that constitutes film, as well as the
visual technology on which such representation depends,
is mystified—mise-en-sce`ne appears as a revelation of the
invisibly real.21 Thus, filmmakers, like Pentecostal pastors,
engage in certain forms of make-believe, constructing
otherwise invisible powers of darkness through speech,
images, and special effects and vesting these visualizations
with divine authority.22
The technology involved in film production is not
immune to the workings of occult forces. Many actors told
me that they found it difficult to play roles of evil persons,
especially witches and native priests, because they were
afraid of inadvertently invoking occult powers. It was even
dangerous to create a shrine with one’s own hands in the
corner of an ordinary living room or under a tree at Aburi
Gardens to film a particular scene. The fact that the shrine
was just part of a movie set did not mean that it could not
become a refuge of occult powers. Some actors who agreed
to play evil characters—after all, to fight evil, evil had to be
depicted—told me that beforehand they had sought the
advice of their pastors, who had then supported the actors
with prayers to fortify them so that the forces invoked
would not harm them. Producers told me that it was
always difficult to find actors for occult roles because of
opposition from the actors’ families, especially from in-
laws.23 Conversely, not all actors were happy to perform in
film scenes in which pastors prayed over them, fearing to
be touched by the Holy Spirit and concerned that this
would reveal the presence of evil spirits (cf. Meyer 1998a).
A video-filmmaker told me that once after he had finally
convinced an actress to allow herself to be prayed over for
a scene, she fell down and was actually possessed: The
mimetic reproduction of deliverance prayers for the pur-
pose of the film had thus turned into the real thing.
Moreover, certain scenes were difficult to film for ostensi-
bly technical reasons. Akuffo, for instance, told me that he
once tried to film a scene on the beach in which a spirit
was shown emerging from the sea. During the filming,
Akuffo’s equipment repeatedly failed, and, in the end, the
scene had to be shot on another day. Many actors saw this
as an indication that the devil did not like his machina-
tions to be revealed on film, and he thus disturbed the
smooth working of the necessary technology. Technology
is thus not merely seen as a neutral device used to visualize
figments of the imagination, but as something able to
invoke rather than merely depict occult and divine forces.
Technology thus partakes in the reality that it creates for
the screen.
The way in which pastors’ and filmmakers’ make-
believe is mutually supportive became very clear to me
when Socrate Safo told me about a phone-in radio pro-
gram, in which callers defending the claim of a Pentecostal
pastor that witchcraft was real made references to film.
Safo stated that most viewers regard film as a representa-
tion of reality in all its complexity, as revealing that which
remains impenetrable to the naked eye. Special effects,
although deliberately created by computer programs, are
often seen as real magic. Although visual technology and
Pentecostal discourse may at first sight seem to belong to
ontologically opposed forms of knowledge production—
and, in fact, in colonial times the main message of visual
technology was the superiority of Western rationality over
magic and superstition—a closer look reveals that the
relationship between the two is more complicated. In this
instance visual technology, the camera, in particular, does
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not serve as simple technology, enabling people to see
better, but is made to function in the register of religion
and to mimetically reproduce vision (cf. Turvey 1999).
As Hent de Vries has eloquently shown, miracle and
special effect, magic and visual technology ‘‘come to
occupy the same space, obey the same regime and the
same logic’’ (2001:28); instead of taking as his point of
departure a binary opposition of religion versus technolo-
gy, he advocates exploration of the interface between
them. As religion depends on mediation to articulate its
message, it requires certain techniques or even technolo-
gies to make accessible the transcendental or invisible.
Indeed, ‘‘mediatization and the technology it entails form
the condition of possibility for all revelation—for its reveal-
ability, so to speak’’ (De Vries 2001:28). I argue that the
slippages between video technology and the invocation of
occult forces, between special effects and magic, testify to
the fact that video technology and Pentecostalism inhabit
the same structure and act in support of each other. In so
doing both emphatically put revelation in the service of
dramatizing transgression into evil, thereby adopting one
of the most striking figures of pentecostalite style: the
‘‘spectacularization of the spectral’’ (Comaroff and Comar-
off 1999:21). Although it would be too simple to equate
filmmakers with pastors, because those in these roles
operate in different, yet increasingly intersecting, are-
nas—the sphere of commercial entertainment and the
sphere of religion—there certainly is an elective affinity
between their two spheres, which are linked through a
shared cultural style.
Conclusion: Religion’s public presence
To capture the growing disjuncture between state and
society and to explore the arena emerging between state
and global market, it is useful to turn to the notion of the
public sphere, provided that ethnographic exploration is
not hampered by a normative and narrow understanding
of that notion. Ghana’s newly evolving public sphere is as
much a product of particular historical power constella-
tions as it thrives on new audiences’ eagerness to make
public what hitherto has been silenced and denied access
by state-controlled media. I have tried to show that where
the state has lost the power to control the media, and thus
the production and circulation of images, there is a space
for the expression of alternative imaginations. Given that a
state-driven construction of Ghanaian national identity,
with its emphasis on ‘‘tradition’’ and ‘‘cultural heritage’’
appears to lack popular appeal and that the state itself
lacks credibility and the confidence of its citizens to
implement ‘‘development,’’ Pentecostalism’s public pres-
ence is not surprising.
Pentecostalism has not only embraced the prosperity
gospel but also advertises itself in the media, and, at the
same time, its cultural style is at the center of commercial
popular culture. Pentecostal churches are run as busi-
nesses, and Pentecostal views are mass reproduced and
commodified in popular culture. This blurring of spheres,
of course, evokes debate in Pentecostal circles about the
nature of Pentecostalism as religion. Within churches, as
bounded religious institutions, those who wield authority
emphasize the depth of religious experience and the im-
portance of being born again. Among Pentecostals there
are concerns about the danger of corrupting religious
content as a result of its mediatization and commerciali-
zation. Such concerns are often, but not always, raised in
reference to other denominations than one’s own, but they
indicate the extent to which mediatization and commer-
cialization have transformed Pentecostalism as an institu-
tional form as well as in terms of its place and role in
society. The emphasis on being born again and on deep
inner change certainly has to be seen as partly produced in
reaction to the increasing dissemination of Pentecostal
signs in the public sphere, which is carried on by a whole
spectrum of people, from staunch believers to cultural
entrepreneurs. The point is that the successful public
presence of Pentecostalism depends much less on depth
of belief than on surface imagery.
Pentecostalism appears not only to be able to attract
masses of believers but also to be so successful in incor-
porating and recasting popular culture as to have had its
style taken up in the field of cultural expression, resulting
in typically Christian entertainment in the fields of film,
music (cf. Collins 2002), popular theater (Gilbert 1998),
and painting.24 In this way, pentecostalite style offers the
narrative structure—and the mood that underpins it—into
which lifeworlds and experiences can be inserted; this
structure enables audiences to give a place to experiences,
hopes, and anxieties that cannot be easily anchored in a
state-driven imagination of identity and the lifeworld
(geared to the village) underlying it. Thus, rather than
merely contributing to an increase in religiosity, under-
stood as an inner process, and rather than simply drawing
viewers into the confines of Pentecostal institutions, pen-
tecostalite Ghanaian films publicly picture alternative,
melodramatic imaginations of lifeworlds and communi-
ties that are appealing because they are able to encom-
pass a wide range of experiences, echo a certain mood
typical of Pentecostal circles, offer a moral perspective,
and at the same time allow for a voyeuristic indulgence in
those occult matters that apparently run counter to the
Christian project of modernity yet are constantly repro-
duced by it.
If in Habermas’s analysis the public sphere emerged
after religion was privatized, the Ghanaian case pinpoints
conditions under which the public sphere appears in a
postcolonial context. In Ghana, Christianity, Pentecostal-
ism in particular, plays a specific role, in that it offers a
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stable and long-standing structure for imagining an alter-
native cultural style. The fact that churches are able to
offer a more viable technological infrastructure than that
offered by the state for expressing and spreading this
cultural style certainly contributes to their public appeal.
The emergence of a pentecostalite style testifies to the
mass-mediatization and commercialization of Pentecos-
talism itself. The forces of commercialization and the easy
accessibility of visual technology, vital in the opening up
of the public sphere, have reshaped both popular culture
and Pentecostalism and facilitated a liaison between the
latter and popular film. This liaison is not incidental but
stems from the fact that the followers of Pentecostalism,
compared with Catholics, orthodox Protestants, and Mus-
lims, have been much more inclined to adopt and effec-
tively use electronic media and more prone to incorporate
popular culture into the religious sphere. The fact that
Pentecostalism appears to be almost everywhere in Gha-
naian public space, however, should not be interpreted
simply in terms of an increase in Pentecostal believers and
religiosity. The point is that the blurring of church and
cinema, religion and business, sermon and film, makes it
increasingly difficult to distinguish between the spheres of
entertainment and Christian religion. Pentecostalism pro-
liferates as it is taken up by cultural entrepreneurs pro-
ducing and endlessly repeating a vast repertoire of images
and formulas in the public sphere. If Pentecostalism
appears to conquer the public sphere, it does so as a
cultural style disseminating its forms of representation
and affirming existing moods. It proliferates in space like
a film of oil, losing depth, yet dispersing into wider and
still wider realms—pentecostal-lite, indeed.25
In a number of respects, the developments described
here are remarkably similar to the intersection of religion
and popular culture that occurred during the course of the
19th and 20th centuries in the United States, most mark-
edly following the rise of the cinema. Laurence Moore
(1994) has argued that the successful public presence of
religion, rather than its confinement to a particular, cul-
turally bounded niche, depends on religion’s ability to
locate itself in the marketplace of culture; this argument
is relevant to the Ghanaian situation. From this perspec-
tive, commodification makes possible the public presence
of religion in modern society, a presence that is realized in
the sphere and mode of entertainment and through style.
The similarity between the U.S. and Ghanaian situations is
not a matter of sheer coincidence, but—at least in part—a
result of actual contacts between U.S. televangelists and
Ghanaian Pentecostals. Whereas in both the United States
and in Ghana, the intersection of entertainment and
Christianity evokes criticism on the part of some believers,
who lament the watering down of religion, it is equally
clear that Christian entertainment is able to bind together
large numbers of people and to instigate the rise of new
communities of sentiment, taste, and style that go far
beyond congregational particularities.
That the success of religion in modern societies
appears to depend on its ability to locate itself and spread
in the marketplace of culture raises important questions
about how to conceptualize religion. The centrifugal pro-
cesses that characterize Pentecostalism’s spread in the
public sphere seem to indicate a significant transformation
of previous practices of mediation. Talal Asad (1993) was
certainly right in emphasizing that the definition of reli-
gion in terms of belief, so long taken for granted in the
study of religion and affirmed by the master narrative of
modernity asserting religion’s public decline, was shaped
on the basis of the modern view of Christianity as private
(1993; see also Van Rooden 2001). This personal, belief-
based definition of Protestantism, globalized on a massive
scale as part of Protestantism’s self-description, is at the
same time undermined through processes of missioniza-
tion. As I have sought to make clear in this article, such a
definition is of little use in seeking to comprehend the
diffuse, public presence of religious forms and elements
and the ways in which they parasitically feed on and
reproduce existing concerns in a new framework.
This shortcoming, however, does not imply that this
modernist definition would be more suited to analysis of
Protestantism prior to its articulation in Ghana’s new
mediascape, at a time when the state was more or less
successful in assigning a certain place to Christianity.
There is good reason to wonder whether Protestantism’s
self-definition in terms of belief and a deep change in the
inner self has ever been fully realized in practice. The talk
among Ghanaians about superficiality of belief and the
lamentation that many churchgoers are just nominal
Christians is as old as the missionary enterprise. Thus,
processes of conversion could easily be described in terms
of a shift to a new cultural style—a source of serious
misgivings on the part of religious leaders who expected
converts to change their inner being. In this sense, the
modern ideal of Protestantism (and for that matter, reli-
gion) as belief has always been subject to subversion in
concrete historical situations.
What is new in the situation described in this article is
that church authorities find it more difficult to contain
Pentecostalism once it goes public, even if Pentecostalism
claims to mimetically copy long-standing religious con-
cerns and even though Pentecostal leaders themselves
partake in visualizing this religion in line with televisual
and video formats. As public Pentecostalism spills over
into the spheres of politics, technology, mass consump-
tion, and entertainment, it becomes more diffuse and
elusive, increasingly difficult to grasp. Lamentations about
the loss of substance are evoked by, as well as testify to,
the extent to which Pentecostalism has become subject to
mass mediation by newly available visual technologies.
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Perhaps the operation of this sort of public religion can be
likened to what Derrida (1998) called a ‘‘tele-technoscien-
tific machine,’’ producing an overwhelming, dazzling
number of images and pressing its distinct cultural style
into the public sphere without being able to control what
its signifying practices will be thought to mean (thereby
risking the loss of the very essence entailed by the notion
of being ‘‘born again’’). Analysts need to reconceptualize
‘‘religion’’ in the context of its expansion into the public
sphere, that is, in a context in which the claimed refer-
ential relationship between outward practice and inner
state, sign or symbol, and meaning, although still at the
core of religious discourse itself, cannot be taken for
granted, and notions like form, style, and surface call for
fruitful exploration.
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1. According to the last population census, 24.1 percent of the
whole population regards itself as Pentecostal-charismatic. In
the Accra region the figure is 37.7 percent. Pentecostals make up
45.8 percent of all Christians in Greater Accra (Ghana Statistical
Service 2000). The popularity of Pentecostalism has had a strong
impact on the more orthodox churches, which themselves have
given room to pentecostally oriented prayer groups, in the case
of the Catholic Church to the Charismatic Renewal. Consisting
of a plethora of churches and prayer groups, Pentecostalism
thus has become a major force that far exceeds its statistically
proven position.
2. The difference between popular culture and public culture is
flimsy and by no means absolute. Here I use public culture to
indicate a new historical moment, brought about by the shift
toward an increasing use of mass media such as TV, radio, and
film. By using the notion ‘‘public culture’’ I seek to capture the fact
that popular culture has become part and parcel of local media
industries geared to a mass public.
3. Flight Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings took power through a military
coup twice: in 1979 to enforce elections and hand over power to a
new democratic government and again in 1981, to end corruption
and undertake a ‘‘house cleaning exercise’’ (cf. Nugent 1996). In
1992 and 1996 he stood for elections and became the president.
His party lost the elections of 2000, and the oppositional NPP
(New Patriotic Party) took over, with John Agyekum Kufuor
as president.
4. Commenting on Hobbes’s concept of a state based on the
auctoritas of the king alone, independent from the ideas of the
ruled, Habermas says, ‘‘Confession is a private matter, private
conviction; without consequences for the state: it assigns as much
value to one as to another, conscience becomes opinion’’
(1990:163, my translation).
5. I would like to thank Stephan Khittel and Gerd Baumann for
drawing my attention to Ludwik Fleck.
6. As the possibility to perceive and make statements about the
world depends on the existence of distinct ‘‘styles of thinking,’’
there is no essential difference between a Denkkollektiv devoted to
science and one devoted to religion. To observers, who are
captured by their own, to them apparently logical, style of think-
ing, another style may look fantastic and arbitrary.
7. John Collins (2002) has argued that Christian churches have
become key actors in the production and promotion of music.
Because the state has put high taxes on importing instruments
and a 10 percent VAT on entertainment, musicians and compa-
nies running ‘‘concert parties’’ (i.e., popular theater), have found it
increasingly difficult to survive in the sphere of secular entertain-
ment. Churches are exempt from taxes, and many artists have
therefore shifted to the churches, working within them and
producing Christian Gospel music.
8. Gifford’s (1998) assertion that the Pentecostal-charismatic
churches generally supported Rawlings is too simple. Rather,
churches attempted to forge certain alliances with those in
power. Initially, one charismatic church especially, the Christian
Action Faith Ministries led by Bishop Duncan Williams, openly
supported Rawlings and prayed for him in public. During the
course of the year 2000, however, relationships between this
church and Rawlings’s NDC (New Democratic Congress) govern-
ment became more strained. This certainly had as much to do
with the fact that the government openly considered the intro-
duction of taxes for churches, which have increasingly turned
into vital commercial enterprises, as with a general, public
dissatisfaction with the NDC. Another charismatic leader, Dr.
Mensa Otabil of the International Central Gospel Church, openly
supported the opposition. Once elected to power, the new NPP
government appointed Otabil a member of the National Com-
mission of Culture, hitherto understood as the backbone of the
traditionalist faction.
9. In the meantime, orthodox Protestant churches and the
Catholic Church, as well as Islamic groups and the Afrikania
movement, have started to buy airtime. But the Pentecostal voice
is much louder than that of any other group.
10. This conference, organized by the International Study Com-
mission on Media, Religion and Culture, was held May 19 – 27,
2000, in Accra. I am very grateful to the organizers for inviting me
to participate in debates and present the results of my research.
11. In turn, Afrikania has undertaken a sort of recasting of
traditional religion, above all, in Protestant terms, that is, with
much emphasis on the Word. See also Van der Veer 1999 with
regard to a similar development in the context of Hinduism.
12. Although the point Akuffo sought to make is clear, it is
nevertheless important to note that he overstated his case. To my
knowledge, there are no such films.
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13. Of course, Akuffo (and video-filmmakers in general) would
only adopt such a perspective in certain critical arenas. Most video-
filmmakers present their films as ‘‘confessions’’ or true stories,
which links them with the truth claims of Pentecostal pastors.
14. Against this background, Spitulnik’s (2000) plea to ‘‘de-
essentialize’’ the audience and widen the frame of reception
studies is well taken; the study of media certainly has to get away
from ‘‘subject-centric’’ approaches, which focus on reception as if
audiences existed in isolation, to what Spitulnik calls ‘‘sociocen-
tric’’ ones, which take into account how media create social
spaces and merge with them. See also Barber 1997.
15. I have reservations with regard to this part of Brooks’s
argument. The point is not that religion vanished with modernity,
but that it was rearticulated. Looking at Max Weber’s Protestant
Ethic, for instance, one can certainly discern significant elective
affinities between melodrama and the new modern mind-set
propounded by Protestantism.
16. Pastors regard the cinema as potentially immoral, because
they suppose that all sorts of sexual encounters take place among
youngsters in the dark. Whenever I visited the cinema with a
group of young Pentecostal girls, they always prayed to God to
keep them clean, and they also closed their eyes during sexually
suggestive advertisements and clips before the main film.
17. See De Witte 2003 for a thorough analysis of the media
practices of the Ghanaian International Central Gospel Church,
which runs its own media studio.
18. Several video-filmmakers told me that they understood
themselves as full Christians and that they regarded films as a
way to convey the Christian message. Some filmmakers also
insisted that they saw their ability to produce films as a gift from
God, and they emphasized that they first saw the plot of their next
film in a dream or as a vision projected on a wall; the source of
their stories, in their view, was God (cf. Meyer 2003b). Such visions
and the belief that God was directing them in some way, often
prompted individuals to enter the film business; thus, filmmaking
did not depend on education alone (as was the case with state-
trained filmmakers), but it was also a ‘‘calling,’’ the result of
‘‘having a vision.’’
19. Eager to present something new, some producers have
started to produce so-called epic films, which are set in villages
long before the advent of colonialism and missionary activity. In
this way, an opposition between Christianity and tradition is
deliberately avoided.
20. Many films, especially Nigerian ones, also tell stories about a
person’s deliberate pact with occult forces that make him or her
indulge in ritual murder and crime. Such films reflect increasing
concerns about personal safety in the big city, with its numerous
dark, immoral spaces. Some films also address the much-heard
criticism that certain pastors run churches to make money—a
criticism that, interestingly, is also fueled by many exponents of
prosperity gospel, who assert that they are not fake pastors but
genuine. Certainly such criticism opens up a space to express
second thoughts about Pentecostalism’s actual success in guiding
people toward heaven on earth and about the actual efficacy of
prosperity gospel.
21. As Rachel Moore (2002) has argued, it is exactly here, in the
invisibility of the technology and the technological devices that go
into the production of a film on the screen, that the ‘‘magic of
cinema’’ lies.
22. Ghanaian video-film producers have always been keen to
produce special effects. Until recently, this was not an easy task,
given that they worked with VHS video-cameras and edited films
by copying all scenes in sequential order from one tape to another.
To produce a special effect, they thus had to copy two different
films, one exactly over the other to achieve an effect such as a
spirit leaving a body or a person transforming into an animal. The
Nigerian films (cf. Haynes 2000) that entered the market on a
massive scale in the late 1990s featured elaborate special effects
produced though computer programs, primarily at MAD-House
Studios in Lagos. Nowadays, special effects can also be produced
through digital editing in Accra, for instance at Nankani Studios.
Filming is increasingly done with digital cameras, but Betacam is
still used.
23. I have heard of several actresses who declined roles involving
occultism and sex (usually only suggested and not really shown,
apart from feet and faces) because, had they accepted the roles,
their fiance´s’ families would have objected to their marriages.
24. See the work of the painter Kwame Akoto, alias Almighty, as
it is presented in the film Future Remembrance (1998) by Nancy
du Plessis and Tobias Wendl.
25. With thanks to Thomas Spear for this pun.
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